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I. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case presents a boundary line dispute between co-terminous owners of land in 
Clearwater County, Idaho. The Dakers purchased their property in June of 1982. The Sims 
purchased their property in January of 1999. According to the legal descriptions in each of their 
deeds, their common boundary-east boundary of Dakers; west boundary of Sims-is a 1116th 
section line running due north and south. The Sims contend the legal description in their deed 
was incorrect; that their true boundary is marked by a fence and an unmarked State Highway 
right of way. 
II. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The original Complaint was filed by the Sims on March 11, 2010, alleging the fence line 
to be their west boundary. They filed an Amended Complaint on November 2,2010, and a 
Second Supplemental Complaint on May 31, 2011, alleging that a surveyed legal description of 
the fence line and a right of way line was the true west boundary of their property. The Dakers 
and the Sims filed motions for summary judgment. Both were denied. The case was tried before 
the District Court on January 17,2012. The Dakers, who are elderly and live out of state did not 
attend and offered no testimony. On January 23,2012, the Court entered its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and Judgment quieting title in the Sims to the line prepared by their 
surveyor and as alleged in their pleadings. The Dakers timely filed a Motion For 
Reconsideration, which was dismissed by the Court on February 7, 2012 with an order stating the 
Court had no authority under IRCP 11 to reconsider its own final decision. 
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III. 
SUMMARY OF FACTS 
The Dakers purchased their property by Warranty Deed in 1982 from Craftwall of Idaho, 
Inc. Def. Ex. "E". Susan C. Dodge, who later married Jimmy Sims and changed her last name to 
Sims, purchased the Sims' property in 1999 by Warranty Deed from Elgin and Claudia Larson. 
PI. Ex. "3". The Larsons purchased from Floyd and Shirley Weddle in 1974. PI. Ex. "5". The 
legal descriptions stated in both of these deeds called the E 1I16thl section line of Section 11, 
Township 35 North, Range 2 East, B.M. as the boundary common to their respective 
properties-the west boundary of the Sims' property and the east boundary of the Daker's 
property. 
The dispute arose when the Dakers' lessee, Randy Hollibaugh hired a surveyor who 
marked the East 1116th line of said Section 11. The Sims later hired the same surveyor, Ben 
Johnson to identify the location of an existing fence line and prepare a legal description of the 
fence from the northwest comer oftheir property (per their deed) Tr. p.l OS, L 12-18; 
southwesterly to its termination at or near the right of way line of State Highway 11, then east on 
said right of way line to the point where the right of way line intersects with the East 1116th line 
of Section 11, then following the legal description stated in their deed back to the point of 
beginning. The description of this line, ultimately ruled to be the west boundary of the Sims' 
property reads as follows: 
1 Sometimes referred to as the West boundary line of the East Yz of the Northeast 114 of 
said Section 11. 
APPELLANTS'BRlEF 2 
Def. Ex. "D". 
Thence, leaving said East boundary line, along an existing fence 
line, South 19°17'12" 
West a distance of 151.36 feet to a point; thence South 22°59'34" 
West a distance of 84.48 feet to a point; thence South 52°53'53" 
West a distance of 152.52 feet to a point; thence South 59°34'27" 
West a distance of 85 feet, more or less, to the Northerly right-of-
way line of State Highway 11; thence, along said right-of-way line, 
to the point of intersection of said right-of-way line and the West 
boundary line of the East Yz of said Northeast 1/4 of Section 11. 
The Sims alleged in their pleadings that when they purchased their property in the 
Northeast quarter of Section 11, "the legal description was incorrect" and that the correct west 
boundary of their property was the line prepared by their surveyor; described above. The west 
boundary of Sims' property stated on their deed reads as follows: 
"Thence South along the said West line of the E1I2 NE1I4 until 
said line intercepts the Northeast right of way of State Highway 11, 
as it now exists;" 
Defense Exhibit "B" is an aerial map with the approximate location of the fence marked 
with a red pen. Defense Exhibit "c" is a diagram of the fence line and State Highway 11 
prepared by surveyor Ben Johnson. 
The fence, of unknown origin, lying mostly on the ground and shrouded in brush when 
the complaint was filed, constitutes only part ofline claimed by Sims to be the west boundary. 
Tr. p. 105, L. 12 - p. 107, L. 13. Commencing on the East 1I16th section line of Section 11, the 
fence immediately leaves and runs away from the north-south deed call (1/16th section line) at 
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three increasing obtuse angles2• Def. Ex. "C" and Def. Ex. "D". As this constituted only about 
one third of the length oftheir boundary, the court apparently inferred without any direct 
evidence, that the second leg of the agreed boundary running in a southeasterly direction was the 
State Highway right of way back to a point on the north-south 1116 line. There was no fence, or 
any other physical evidence of this part of the line (other than the surface of the road presumably 
centered in the State Highway 11 right of way). Tr. p. 105, L. 12 - p. 106, L. 2. 
Plaintiff's Exhibits "1" and "2" is a video of the fence line shot from its northern most 
point to its southern most point. The video shows the fence lying on the ground in many places 
and shrouded in brush. The video of the fence stops near the highway. 
Bradley Bauer, who shot the video testified that brush had been cleared on the east side 
(Sims) of the fence after commencement oflitigation. Tr. p. 12, L. 23, Tr. p. 17, L. 5-18. 
Jimmy Sims testified that he never maintained the fence during the last twelve years. He 
also testified that he did not know the Dakers owned the neighboring property to the east until the 
dispute arose with Hollibaugh. He telephoned Mrs. Daker and testified that she said she and her 
husband had purchased their property by the fence lines. Tr. p. 73, L. 6-23. When asked about 
his occupation and use of the disputed property, Sims testified as follows: 
Q. Okay. So, you didn't clear the brush until after you hired 
Mr. Cox in this case. 
A. I think so. 
Q. SO the purpose, again, of clearing this brush on this side of 
the fence was it related to this lawsuit and this dispute? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, prior to that time what other work did you do on this 
two or three acres that's east of this fence line? 
2 The final call was a section offence running 59°34'27" southwest of the East 1116th 
line called in the deed, terminating nearly 300 feet from that line. 
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A. Very little. Weve never even cut firewood down there. 
There's an old salt lick down there that Elgin had out that I 
would keep the brush beat back from that. There was a 
couple of apple trees I had pruned and was fertilizing them. 
Q. Did you plant any apple trees? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. And why did you clear brush around this salt lick? 
A. Where I could see the game. 
Tr. p. 81, L. 10 - p. 82, L. 10. 
Alvin Smolinski leased the Daker property for livestock pasturage and maintained the 
subject fence commencing during Larson's ownership of the Sim's property (1974-1999) until 
about 2004. He testified that he considered the fence to be the east boundary of the Daker 
property. Tr. p. 29, L. 16-25. When questioned about logging up to the fence line on either side, 
he testified as follows: 
Q. (By Mr. Cox) Was there any logging on the property that 
you leased, first of all, from White, then Tannahill, 
Craftwall, and then Daker? 
A. Well, there was logging on both sides, but I'm not sure who 
did it, when - when it was done. 
Q. Did-
A. And some of it, I think, was done - maybe both sides was 
done prior to me renting that particular pasture. 
* * * 
Q. (By Mr. Cox) Do you know how many different logging 
operations were done on the Daker property? 
A. One I know of. 
Q. When was that, do you recall? 
A. No, I don't. 
Q. You know of any logging that was done on the Sims' 
property? 
A. No, I don't know for sure. 
Tr. p. 31, L. 21 - p. 32, LA, p. 34, L. 14-21. 
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Linda Beard testified that she thought the fence was the boundary. She also recalled her 
parents pasturing livestock on the property within a fence surrounding the entire property, 
including the section along the State Highway, during the five and one-half years she lived on 
what is now the Sims' property as a child-sixth grade through twelfth grade. Tr. p. 85, L. 15 - p. 
86, L. 22. She didn't say who her parents were and did not state her age. 
Randy Hollibaugh who leased the Daker property for about three years, sometime after 
Smolinski surrendered his lease in 2004, was not uncertain as to the approximate location of the 
true east boundary. He testified as follows: 
Q. It's a fence that's nowhere near the boundary line? 
A. No. And I have always known where the comers were so I 
never assumed it would be the boundary. 
Q. Did you think that this fence line that's in dispute was the 
boundary line for the Daker's property? 
A. No. I've always known where the comers were. I just -
it's so brushy in there I just didn't want to ever have to go 
in there and brush it out too bad. 
Q. I see. So you knew where the comers were because you 
owned property immediately to the north? 
A. Well, I've always had a map. When I leased the Daker 
property I - obviously when I first got it I got a map and I 
did know where the comers were, yes. 
Tr. p. 44, L. 14 - p. 45, L. 10. 
The court made no mention of the Hollibaugh testimony in its findings and gave no 
indication as to why it lacked credibility or relevance, having considered the testimony of other 
third parties who said they thought the fence was the boundary. 
The judgment awarded to the Sims a triangular parcel; one leg the fence; the second leg 
the right of way and the third leg the 1116th line stated in their deed, increasing their of acreage 
by 25% from approximately twelve to approximately fifteen acres. The Clearwater County tax 
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assessor shows this three acres to be owned by the Dakers who have paid taxes on it for nearly 
thirty years. 
IV. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The appellate court will only set aside a trial court's findings of fact if they are clearly 
erroneous. In deciding whether findings of fact are clearly erroneous, this Court determines 
whether the findings are supported by substantial, competent evidence. Evidence is substantial if 
a reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely on it. Findings based on substantial, competent 
evidence, although conflicting, will not be disturbed on appeal. The appellate court exercises free 
review over conclusions oflaw. Neider v. Shaw, 138 Idaho 503, 506, 65 P.3d 528 (2003). The 
elements of boundary by agreement must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Weitz v. 
Green, 148 Idaho 851, 858,230 P.3d 743, 751 (2010). 
V. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Were the District Court's findings of fact sufficient to support the conclusion that 
an implied boundary line agreement replaced the line stated in the parties' deeds? 
2. Did the District Court fail to find the physical nature and location of the fence to 
be an insufficient monument to establish boundary by agreement? 
3. Does the evidence of record establish that if there was a boundary line agreement 
between prior owners, it had to have been an agreement to change the boundary, 
thereby an oral conveyance of three acres in violation of the Statute of Frauds? 
APPELLANTS'BRlEF 7 
VI. 
ARGUMENT 
In Idaho, the phrase "boundary by acquiescence" is often used interchangeably with 
"boundary by agreement," although the latter is a more accurate description of the doctrine. To 
prove boundary by agreement, there must be an uncertain or disputed boundary and a subsequent 
agreement fixing the boundary, which resolves the dispute or removes the uncertainty. The 
agreement need not be express, but the court may infer the existence of an agreement by the 
surrounding circumstances and conduct of the parties. Griffel v. Reynolds, 136 Idaho 397, 34 
P .3d 1080 (2001). 
The District Court's findings of fact below: 
In this case the court finds that the fence line has been in its 
current location for far more than 40 years (it was old when 
Mr. Smolinski began pasturing cattle on the Daker property 
in the 1970s). The court finds that the fence line was 
treated as the boundary between the two properties (Ms. 
Daker told Ms. Sims on the phone that she thought the 
fence line was the boundary; The Larsons thought the fence 
line was the boundary; Mr. Smolinski thought the fence line 
was the boundary; Ms. Beard's family thought the fence 
line was the boundary and utilized the disputed property to 
pasture their animals without objection; logging occurred 
on both the properties, but only up to the fence line; and the 
Sims thought the fence was the boundary and have 
maintained fruit trees and a wildlife observation point on 
the disputed property without objection. 
R. p. 244, L. 15-25 
The court's statement of the law: 
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The Sims have the burden of proving that the fence is a boundary 
by agreement by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence. To 
prove a boundary by agreement the Sims must prove that the 
boundary between the two properties was uncertain or disputed, 
and that there was an agreement between two persons owning 
lands on either side of the fence that the fence would indeed 
constitute the boundary between their properties. The agreement 
may be express or implied (from the landowner's conduct). 
Two presumptions arise when evaluating the existence of an 
implied agreement. First, when a fence line has been erected, and 
the coterminous landowners have treated that fence line as the 
boundary between their properties for such a length of time that 
neither ought to be allowed to deny the correctness of its location 
the law presumes an agreement fixing that fence line is the 
boundary. Secondly, if the fence has been in place for a long time 
and treated as the boundary between two properties, and there is no 
evidence as to why the fence was originally built in it current 
location, the law presumes that the fence was originally located as 
a boundary by agreement because of uncertainty or dispute as to 
the true line. 
The court's conclusion: 
Based upon these finding and the two presumptions referred to 
above, the court concludes that the boundary between the Daker 
and Sims property was uncertain. The court further concludes that 
there was an implied agreement that the fence line described in 
Defendant's Exhibit C was built as a boundary between the two 
properties. 
R. p. 244, L. 26-31. 
A. Acquiscence: 
Occupation and use up to a fence or other monument and acquiescence to that occupation 
and use by the adjacent owner is evidence of a boundary agreement. The Court made no finding 
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as to when the agreement may have been formed or what specific occupation and use established 
acquiescence on the part of an adjacent owner-Dakers or their predecessors. 
Jimmy Sims testified to use and occupation from 1999 to present: Picking fruit from wild 
trees; clearing brush around them and applying fertilizer; clearing brush around a natural salt lick 
to provide a better view of it from their home. There was no brush clearing along the fence until 
after litigation was commenced. Tr. p. 81, L. 10 - p. 82, L. 10. 
Linda Beard testified that during the five and one-half years she lived on the Sims' 
property as a child (6th through 12th grade) her parents had chickens, goats, horses, cows; that 
they had "full run of the property" and the property was "fully fenced all the way around.", 
including a fence along the highway. She also testified there was no logging or firewood cutting 
on the disputed ground by her parents. There was no direct evidence of the time period to which 
Linda Beard was referring. Nor did she state the identity of her parents or her present age.3 And 
she was unable to identify the owners of what is now the Daker property when she lived on the 
Sims property. Tr. p. 85, L. 13 - p. 86, L. 24. 
Alvin Smolinski offered the only testimony as to use of the Daker property-cattle 
pasturage-and he was neither the owner or an agent for the owner. During his occupation, first 
the Larsons, then the Sims owned the property east of the disputed fence line. Tr. p. 29, L. 20. 
There was no evidence of the nature of the Larsons' use or occupation of the disputed ground. 
3 The Court was under the impression her parents were owners prior to the Larsons, who 
sold to the Sims in 1999. In the FACTUAL BACKGROUND section of its findings and 
conclusions, "Linda Beard's parents owned the Sims' property sometime prior to the Larsons." 
The Larson's purchased from the Weddles in 1974. R. p. 242, L. 1-3. 
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Although an agreement can be inferred from a long period 
of acquiescence, the trial court is not required to draw that 
inference. "Acquiescence in the location and maintenance 
of a line fence for a great length of time may be 
presumptive evidence of an agreement as to the true 
boundary line, but is not conclusive evidence. II Brown v. 
Brown, 18 Idaho 345, 357,110 P. 269, 273 (1910); accord 
Luce v. Marble, 142 Idaho 264, 127 P.3d 167 (2005) 
(specific facts of the case can prevent this presumption 
from operating). 
In this case, any agreement establishing an uncertain 
boundary would have to be inferred from the conduct of the 
parties viewed in light of the surrounding circumstances. Id. 
Since acquiescence is evidence of an agreement 
establishing the boundary, the relevant conduct to show 
acquiescence would be that of the parties to the alleged 
agreement. The conduct of subsequent owners, or their 
understandings as to the boundary, would not prove or 
disprove an implied agreement... 
Downey v. Vavold, 144 Idaho 592, 596, 166 P.3d 382,387 (2007). 
First, there was no evidence of a long period of occupation and acquiescence. The Sims' 
use of the disputed property was not of a nature to give notice of the fence and right of way being 
an agreed boundary. It is not necessary that a fence monument the line. A cultivation line-where 
adjacent owners cultivate to a line for many years-will suffice. But there must be clear, visible 
evidence of the location of the line and occupation and use up to that line to establish boundary 
by implied agreement. Griffel, supra And the occupation and use to a monument must be 
observable on the ground sufficient to give constructive notice of the boundary line agreement to 
a prospective purchaser of the property. Weitz, supra, at 858, 751. 
B. The Monument: 
The condition of the fence is relevant. Weitz, supra So is the location. The Idaho 
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Supreme Court recently made it clear that a fence (or other monument) need not be created to 
effect an agreement. Adjoining owners can later agree to make the monument the line. And if 
the elements of uncertainty as to the location of the true line and acquiescence to occupation and 
use are proven, it can be reasonably inferred that an oral boundary agreement must have been 
formed by prior adjacent owners. Huskinson v. Nelson, 152 Idaho 547, 272 P.3d 519 (2012). 
And the fence or other monument need not be near the line revealed by a later survey of 
the disputed boundary. Flying Elk Investment, LLC v. Cornwall, 149 Idaho 9, 232 P.3d 330 
(2010). But where the fence deviates immediately and radically from the line called in the deeds 
and has been only a partial fence for at least the last decade, it is not reasonable to infer the fence 
was the boundary line called in their deed. See, Luce v. Marble, 142 Idaho 264, 127 P.3d 167, 
(2005). 
In Flying Elk, supra, the fence deviated substantially in places from the survey lines, but it 
ran roughly parallel to the lines called in the deeds. And there was clear evidence of the time of 
its construction by brothers who owned adjacent parcels and they, followed by subsequent 
owners, cultivated ground up to the fence. And the fence was well maintained in the same 
location for over 50 years. In Huskinson, supra,and Griffel, supra, there was a clear, visible 
demarcation parallel to the line later surveyed, reflecting years of cultivation by adjacent owners 
up to the line. In all of these cases where an agreed boundary was found, a stranger to the 
properties could look at the fence or crop line and reasonably assume it to be the boundary. 
Here, because the deeds call the boundary to be the north-south East 1116th line and the 
fence runs at increasing obtuse angles from the deed calls, it could not be reasonably assumed the 
fence was the boundary line. Not even by Jimmy Sims. 
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Q. Now, were you at what point did you become aware that 
this fence line did not run north, south, before you 
purchased it or after? 
A. I - it was after. I didn't go out there that first day with a 
compass. 
Q. But you did you were aware that the fence line that you're 
claiming is the boundary line does not run north and south? 
A. Not true north and south, no. 
Q. And you were aware 
A. And there's an angle in it. There's a weird angle in it 
partway down going off to the southwest. 
Tr. p.79, L. 22 - p.80, L. 8. 
So if there was an agreement between unknown prior owners to make the fence the 
boundary between their properties, it was an agreement to change the line. 
C. Uncertain: 
Although this court concluded the line described in the deed was uncertain to the 
coterminous property owners (without stating what evidence led to this conclusion), it is the 
uncertainty or dispute element which is missing in this case. It cannot be concluded that any 
1I16th section line stated in a legal description is uncertain until it is surveyed. 
Here, the specific facts of the case prevent this presumption 
from operating in Luce's favor. The doctrine of boundary by 
agreement or acquiescence is based on a reasonable 
assumption implied from the surrounding circumstances. 
See Griffel, 136 Idaho at 400,34 P.3d at 1083. In our prior 
cases, we have applied the presumption when it was 
reasonable to assume from the facts on the ground that at 
some prior point landowners agreed or acquiesced to a 
certain location as the boundary between their properties. 
However, the shape of Parcel A is so irregular and 
encompasses such a large portion of the Marble property 
that such an assumption would be unreasonable. Therefore, 
since Luce cannot rely on this presumption and failed to 
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present any evidence the fence lines surrounding Parcel A 
settled an actual disagreement or uncertainty, she cannot 
establish her right to Parcel A through boundary by 
agreement or acquiescence. 
Luce, supra, at 271,275. 
The fence at some point must have settled a dispute or resolved doubt as to the location 
of a common line. And of course the fence can miss the line or deviate to some degree, but 
where a fence representing less than a third of the boundary line deviates radically from the true 
line, it is illogical to assume the purpose of the fence was built or later agreed to resolve doubt as 
to an uncertain line. And if it was an agreement to change the line, it was a conveyance of land 
in violation of the statute of frauds. 
There was no uncertainty or dispute regarding the surveyed line 
between the parties' properties, where the parties' predecessors had 
agreed to change their boundary to avoid the inconvenience of the 
surveyed line, which bisected the defendants' granary, stated the 
court in Lisher v. Krasselt, (1972) 94 Idaho 513, 492 P2d 52, later 
app 96 Idaho 854, 538 P2d 783. Accordingly, the court ruled that 
the defendants could not establish the boundary by oral agreement 
or by acquiescence, but it decided that they were nonetheless 
entitled to the disputed area because they had proved adverse 
possession, and it affirmed the judgment in their favor except as to 
the description of the disputed area. 
72 ALR 4th 132, §9. 
D. Adverse Possession: 
To take title to a neighbor'S property by virtue of physical occupation and acquiescence to 
the occupation, Idaho Code § 5-210 requires: 
For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession, by a person 
claiming title not founded upon a written instrument, judgment or 
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decree, land is deemed to ave been possessed and occupied in the 
following cases only: 
(I) Where it has been protected by a substantial enclosure. 
(2) Where it has been usually cultivated or improved. 
Provided, however, that in no case shall adverse possession be 
considered established under the provisions of any sections of this 
code unless it shall be shown that the land has been occupied and 
claimed for the period of twenty (20) years continuously, and the 
party or persons, their predecessors and grantors, have paid all the 
taxes, state, county or municipal, which have been levied and 
assessed upon such land according to law ... Provided further, that 
for purposes of establishing adverse possession pursuant to this 
section, a person claiming adverse possession must present clear 
and convincing evidence that the requirements of subsection (I) or 
(2) of this section have been met. 
Here, the Sims did not usually cultivate, improve or substantially enclose the disputed 
property. Nor did they, or any prior owner pay property taxes on the three acres. What they 
could not claim by adverse possession, they have succeeded in claiming under the doctrine of 
boundary by agreement. If the lower court's ruling is upheld, an adverse claimant who is also 
adjoining owner will have authority to claim ownership of an irregular parcel of his neighbor's 
ground without meeting the requirements of statute quoted above. Occupation to a fence line 
and acquiescence to that occupation for no specific period will suffice. 
VII. 
CONCLUSION 
The fence in this case is so old, no-one remembers who built it or why. There have been 
multiple conveyances of what is now the Daker property and the Sims' property while the fence 
was in existence. Each of these conveyances used the same East 111 6th line call to define the 
subject boundary. Because the fence in its present location could never be mistaken for the deed 
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description (with the benefit of a compass), it would seem parties to the agreement, or 
subsequent owners would have changed the description of this line in their deeds. 
In recognizing the reliance people often place on fences to 
denote boundaries, courts should not overlook the equally 
important reliance that people place on legal descriptions in 
public records to define the boundaries of ownership. A 
description used and relied upon repeatedly by many 
persons--in addition to the owners of the property--for 
perhaps a century or longer, should not be disregarded 
lightly to accommodate the theory of boundary by oral 
agreement. 
Dreher v. Powell, 120 Idaho 715, 819 P.2d 569 (Idaho App. 1991). 
Here the lower court cited no legal authority to support its conclusions, so it is difficult to 
understand the rationale for the ruling. The Sims have failed to present clear and convincing 
evidence necessary to support their claim of ownership of the disputed three acres under the 
doctrine of boundary by agreement. To allow this ruling to stand would effect an inappropriate 
expansion of the doctrine to the detriment of reliability and certainty in clearly stated legal 
descriptions. It would also diminish the authority and scope of the statute of frauds and adverse 
possession statutes. The Dakers seek reversal of the judgment. 
DATED this t4ay of July, 2012. 
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